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Chatbots and their potential for interfering in political discourse came to the 
forefront of attention during the United States 2016 elections in the context of spreading 
disinformation and exacerbating the polarization pervading the elections, but chatbots 
have been used in many areas to influence political discourse. Although the chatbots are 
not currently able to easily pass as humans, developments in artificial intelligence, 
particularly Natural Language Processing may allow them to engage with people in a 
human-like manner in the future, enhancing their ability to exploit the rifts in society and 
create greater polarization in politics. To prevent this, many sectors of society need to 
come together to combat the potential bad effects of chatbots on political discourse. 
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 Introduction  
Following the 2016 United States’ (U.S.) presidential elections, Americans and people 
around the world were alarmed to learn that Russian chatbots had been at work, attempting to 
influence the elections by interacting with voters and spreading fake news.1 This is not the first 
time, however, that chatbots have made an appearance in political communication, and many 
people may not realize how widespread chatbots are. Chatbots have been used to influence 
political discourse for years, including conversations about the civil war in Syria, the Brexit vote, 
and more.  
In addition to their political uses, chatbots are useful in areas like retail, news curation, 
and healthcare. Chatbots’ abilities continue to progress, and they have the potential to affect 
society positively, but they also bring risks to political discourse, as highlighted by the 2016 U.S. 
elections. By encouraging polarization, chatbots can destabilize the political landscape and 
weaken democratic norms.2 While it is impossible to stop the use of chatbots in political 
discourse, but there are many steps that can make them less effective; finding the correct steps 
and implementing them requires more than technological skills, it requires society to look to the 
intersection of technology, culture, and institutions to find solutions.3  
 
1 Gabe O’Connor and Avie Schneider, “How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake News During the 2016 
Election,” NPR, April 3, 2017, accessed December 7, 2018 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-
news-during-the-2016-election 
2 See, Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference 
in Democracies,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, No. 27 (2018): 4, accessed May 23, 2019, 
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/asd-policy-blueprint-countering-authoritarian-interference-democracies. 
3 Yochai Benkler, et., al., “Understanding Media and Information Quality in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, 
Automation, Algorithms, and Machine Learning,” Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 




This paper will discuss the use of chatbots in political discourse, technological 
innovations that will affect chatbots, and how governments, businesses, organizations, and 
individuals can prepare for and respond to chatbots. This paper is divided into several sections: 
section one defines chatbots and gives a brief overview of what chatbots do. Section two 
provides a sample of the ways chatbots have been used to influence political discourse. Section 
three discusses methods for detecting chatbots. Section four discusses how improvements and 
innovations in machine learning and natural language processing will make it harder to detect 
chatbots and will increase chatbots’ abilities to influence people. Section five will conclude with 
a discussion on the current strategic value of chatbots compared to their potential uses, and steps 
that governments, the private sector, and individuals should take to combat chatbots’ negative 





Section One: What are Chatbots and How Do They Work? 
The term “bot” refers to computer software designed to “perform simple, repetitive, and 
robotic tasks”4 automatically, i.e., without human assistance. To this chatbots add the ability to 
“perceive their environment and take actions that maximize their chance of success at some 
goal,” and to use speech to communicate with humans.5 Chatbots use artificial intelligence, 
especially machine learning and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to respond to human 
conversation.6 NLP is a form of artificial intelligence that “teaches machines to read, analyze and 
interpret human language,” which allows a computer to understand what a person says to it, and 
respond appropriately.7 The more a person talks to a chatbot, the better the chatbot becomes at 
understanding and communicating with that person and other persons who engage in similar 
conversations with the chatbot.8  
Consequently, humans can write computer programs, i.e. chatbots, that can post 
messages, tweet, and converse9 without needing human direction. This allows the program writer 
 
4 Philip N. Howard, Gillian Bolsover, Bence Kollanyi, Samantha Bradshaw, Lisa-Maria Neudert.  “Junk News and 
Bots during the U.S. Election: What Were Michigan Voters Sharing Over Twitter?” Data Memo 2017.1. Oxford, 
UK: Project on Computational Propaganda, accessed December 7, 2018 https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/junk-news-
and-bots-during-the-u-s-election-what-were-michigan-voters-sharing-over-twitter/. 
5Aggeliki Androutsopoulou, E. Loukis, Nikos Karacapilidis, and Yannis Charalabidis, “Transforming the 
Communication Between Citizens and Government Through AI-Guided Chatbots,” Government Information 
Quarterly, October 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328257121_Transforming_the_communication_between_citizens_and_go
vernment_through_AI-guided_chatbots.  
6 Alison Bolen, “What are Chatbots? And How Can You Combine Them With Analytics?” SAS Insights, accessed 
May 22, 2019, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/analytics/what-are-chatbots.html. 
7 Bolen, “What are Chatbots? And How Can You Combine Them With Analytics?” 
8 Bolen, “What are Chatbots? And How Can You Combine Them With Analytics?” 
9 Howard, Philip N., and Bence Kollanyi. 2016. “Bots, #Strongerin, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda during 
the UK-EU Referendum.” Working Paper 2016.1.:1, Oxford, UK: Project on Computational 
Propaganda. www.politicalbots.org. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2798311.  
4 
 
to influence online conversations in a desired direction without providing intensive oversight, 
and multiplies the influence the programmer can have, beyond what is possible for a human.   
Although chatbots can be used for a variety of purposes this paper is particularly 
interested in political chatbots—chatbots with political motives.10 Political actors can use 
chatbots to spread information or opinions, exaggerate how many supporters an official or 
particular issue has, or create artificial trends.11 This make chatbots valuable tools for 
governments and organizations who seek to affect political discourse and events.  
  
 
10 “Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda during the UK-EU Referendum,” 1. 




Section Two: Chatbot Usage in Political Discourse 
 Although it was the 2016 U.S. elections that shone the spotlight on political chatbots a for 
many people, chatbots have been used in the political arena for some time, by both state and non-
state actors, including the U.S. government. Close examination of chatbots also shows there are 
five general reasons a group or individual may use chatbots in political discourse: to drown out 
information, to smear a person or event, to amplify a message, to antagonize different sides on an 
issue to create division, or to spread information or disinformation to the public. This section 
provides global examples of how governments, politicians, and activists have used chatbots to 
influence political discourse, prior to the 2016 elections, and the method they used to gain 




















including in 2016 
presidential 
election 

















awareness of the 
situation 















Unlikely to have 


















Did not secure 
election success 





































contributed to the 
vote to leave the 
E.U.  
Table 1: Examples of Political Chatbots Across the Globe 
In 2010, researchers at the University of Indiana discovered chatbots attempting to 
influence political discourse when they found a bot-driven smear campaign against the Delaware 
U.S. senate candidate, Chris Koons. They linked these bots back to conservative activists that 
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were involved with “The Freedomist” website.12 U.S. politicians have also used chatbots to 
make themselves appear more popular on social networks than they actually are: for example, in 
the 2012 elections, Mitt Romney “was accused of buying thousands of followers on Twitter in a 
bid to seem more popular,”13 and Trump had chatbot followers with Latino names tweet 
favorably about him to make him appear more popular with Latino voters.14 Both politicians and 
political activists used chatbots in the United States to try to influence elections and popular 
support, and some argue they may have helped Donald Trump win the presidential election.15 
 In 2011, the Syrian government used chatbots to drown out information about 
crackdowns on protestors at the beginning of the Syrian civil war. The government created spam 
Twitter accounts that would send tweets every few minutes that targeted #Syria, which people 
had been following to learn what was happening with the Syrian protests. These spam accounts 
would post about a variety of topics, including “photography, old Syrian sports scores, links to 
Syrian comedy shows, pro-regime news, and threats against [those]…who expressed their 
support of the protests.”16 By attaching tweets that had nothing to do with the protests to this 
hashtag the Syrian government mixed irrelevant information into the discussion, which could 
have decreased awareness of the situation and affected the international response.  
 
12 Philip N. Howard, S. Woolley, and R. Calo, “Algorithms, bots, and political communication in the US 2016 
election: The challenge of automated political communication for election law and administration,” Journal of 
Information Technology and Politics (2018), DOI: 10.1080/19331681.2018.1448735 
13 Howard, “Algorithms, bots, and political communication in the US 2016 election: The challenge of automated 
political communication for election law and administration,” 87. 
14 Howard, “Algorithms, Bots, and Political Communication in the US 2016 Election: The Challenge of Automated 
Political Communication for Election Law and Administration, 81.  
15 Jeanna Smialek, “Twitter Bots Helped Trump and Brexit Win, Economic Study Says,” Bloomberg, May 21, 
2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-21/twitter-bots-helped-
trump-and-brexit-win-economic-study-says. 
16 Anas Qteish, “Spam Bots Flooding Twitter to Drown Info About #Syria Protests,” Advox: Global Voices, April 




 Russia also used chatbots to interfere with political discourse before its intervention 
efforts in the 2016 elections. On February 27, 2015, Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime 
minister and one of Putin’s top critics, was shot dead in Moscow.17 Observers noticed that just 
hours after the shooting a group of Twitter accounts began posting, blaming Ukrainians for the 
shooting. 18 An internet researcher, Lawrence Alexander, collected a list of accounts that 
tweeted the phrase, “Ukrainians killed him…he was stealing one of their girlfriends,” and 
discovered that there were 2,900 such accounts, and they were highly connected—most of them 
followed each other—an unusual characteristic for accounts if they are independent of each 
other.19 Further, 87% of these accounts did not have time zone information, and 92% had no 
Twitter favorites: in a random Twitter sample, those numbers are 51% and 15%, respectively.20 
The differences between the accounts tweeting about Ukrainian involvement in the shooting and 
a random sample of Twitter accounts make it very likely the tweets were coming from chatbots: 
likely Russian chatbots who were attempting to point the finger away from Russian involvement 
in the murder.21 Although this may have been the goal, the news around the shooting tended to 
focus on suspicions about Russian involvement, so the chatbots did not appear to have a 
significant impact.22 
 
17 Vladimir kara-Murza, “The Kremlin is Blocking Scrutiny of its Investigation Into the Murder of Boris Nemtsov,” 
August 2, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-
post/wp/2018/08/02/the-kremlin-is-blocking-scrutiny-of-its-investigation-into-the-murder-of-boris-
nemtsov/?utm_term=.76c2ef6e7c19. 
18 Lawrence Alexander, “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign,” Global 
Voices, April 2, 2015, accessed December 7, 2018, https://globalvoices.org/2015/04/02/analyzing-kremlin-twitter-
bots/. 
19 “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign.” 
20 “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign.” 
21 “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign.” 
22 See, e.g., Ivan Nechepurenko, “Five Convicted in Killing of Boris Nemtsov, Russian Opposition Leader,” NYT, 




 The Mexican government and Mexican political parties also used chatbots in elections 
and to spread disinformation. For example, in the 2012 presidential elections, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) used tens of thousands of chatbots to amplify their message by 
automatically tweeting and retweeting certain messages, in the hopes of becoming one of 
Twitter’s trending topics.23 Chatbots also came into play in a 2017 governorship race for the 
central state of Mexico: in the election, the PRI used chatbots to spread messages against its 
main rival candidate, Delfina Gomez.24 Researchers also found that chatbots were deployed in 
the 2018 election: all parties used them, although the PRI has been the focus of reporting.25 
Chatbots also inserted fake news into the media, for example, researchers found a March 2018 
claim that an opinion poll commissioned by the New York Times,  showed Meade (the PRI 
candidate) in the lead.26 The poll, however, was fictional, as Mead appeared in third place in 
most polls.27 The widespread use of chatbots in Mexico shows the many ways actors can use 
them to attempt to influence political discourse; the outcomes of the recent elections, however, 
show they may not be particularly good at influencing political discourse. The PRI used chatbots 
more than perhaps any other party in the 2018 elections, but they suffered a “record defeat” on 
election day, when the PRI presidential candidate won only 16% of the vote, putting him in third 
place, and the party lost all of the governorship races.28 
 
23 Mike Orcutt, “Twitter Mischief Plagues Mexico’s Election,” MIT Technology Review, June 21, 2012, accessed 
December 7, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428286/twitter-mischief-plagues-mexicos-election/. 
24 Marcos Martinez, “Mexico Election: Concern About Election Bots, Trolls, and Fakes,” BBC, May 30, 2018, 
accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44252995. 
25 “Mexico Election: Concern About Election Bots, Trolls, and Fakes.”  
26 Mexico Election: Concern About Election Bots, Trolls, and Fakes.”  
27 “Mexico Election: Concern About Election Bots, Trolls, and Fakes.”  
28 Dave Graham, “RIP PRI? Mexico’s Ruling Party in ‘Intensive Care’ After Drubbing,” Reuters, July 4, 2018, 




 Researchers also examined chatbots and political discourse in Venezuela. In one study, 
researchers found that during 2015 politicians and activists used chatbots for “impression 
management” by “spreading news about how leaders perform in public events within Venezuela 
and…building the reputation that leaders are international statesmen in conversation with the 
leadership of other countries.”29 Overall, they found the effect of chatbots to be subtle, with less 
than 10% of retweets coming from chatbots, and most retweets promoting harmless political 
events, rather than attacking people or spreading disinformation.30 Here, politicians used 
chatbots to influence political discourse but their impact was small, and the harmful effects that 
manifest in other instances are not apparent, although the researchers posited chatbots usage may 
have been different if they had studied their use during a political crisis.31  
 The Brexit vote is another example of chatbot activity that garnered significant attention 
because of concerns about disinformation and chatbots’ role in the conversation about whether to 
leave or stay in the European Union (E.U.). Researchers with the Computational Propaganda 
Project at Oxford looked at Twitter activity during the Brexit vote to  find how much social 
media content was related to positions on the Brexit debate, and how much of that conversation 
was driven by chatbots.32 They found that of the ten Twitter accounts that generated the most 
volume on the issue, seven of the ten were almost certainly chatbots.33 These top users did not 
create new content, but instead retweeted others’ content—they amplified opinions and trends.34 
Further, they found the chatbots were mainly associated with hashtags related to the argument 
for leaving the E.U., although the two most active accounts for each side of the debate were both 
 
29 Michelle Forelle, et., al., “Political Bots and the Manipulation of Public Opinion in Venezuela,” July 25, 2015, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635800, 5. 
30 “Political Bots and the Manipulation of Public Opinion in Venezuela,” 6. 
31 “Political Bots and the Manipulation of Public Opinion in Venezuela,” 3. 
32 “Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda During the UK-EU Referendum,” 1. 
33 “Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda During the UK-EU Referendum,” 4. 
34“Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda During the UK-EU Referendum,” 4. 
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chatbots, neither of which generated new content, but instead retweeted content from their 
respective sides.35 Recent research suggests that chatbots may have influenced the vote to leave 
the E.U., although that may be attributable to Russian, rather than British chatbots, which are not 
discussed in this particular example.36 Russian influence aside, researchers are still concerned 
about the effect of chatbots and political discourse because of chatbots’ ability to spread 
misinformation automatically across social media, and users’ increasing struggle to separate bots 
from humans on social media.37  
 These examples showcase just a few of the times, places, and reasons actors have used 
chatbots: a study by the Computational Propaganda Project reviewed organized social media 
manipulation throughout the world and found that of the 46 countries they sampled 38 had fake 
accounts that were automated to disperse political messages, and these messages were usually 
either pro-government, or attacks on the opposition.38 The countries that had these fake 
automated accounts ranged from Angola to China to Ecuador to South Africa and many more in 
between.39 Chatbots are widespread, and will likely spread more widely in the future.  
The preceding examples focus on Twitter chatbots, who act mainly by liking and 
retweeting content rather than creating new content and engaging in conversation with other 
users. There are also chatbots that can have conversations, however, and they have begun to 
influence the political sphere. The 2016 U.S. elections saw the rise of chatbots involved in the 
 
35 “Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda During the UK-EU Referendum,” 2, 5. 
36 Jeanna Smialek, “Twitter Bots Helped Trump and Brexit Win, Economic Study Says,” Bloomberg, May 21, 
2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-21/twitter-bots-helped-
trump-and-brexit-win-economic-study-says. 
37 “Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational Propaganda During the UK-EU Referendum,” 5. 
38 Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized 
Social Media Manipulation,” Working Paper 2018.1. Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda, 12, 
http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf. 
39 Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized 




election process. The HelloVote chatbot, a Facebook and text-based chatbot helped people 
register to vote: it greeted users, saying “’I can get you registered to vote with just a few 
messages,’” and would use information provided by the users to help them register.40 Then, as 
election day drew closer, the chatbot would send individuals details on where and how to vote.41 
Another, Facebook-based chatbot, HillYEAH!, offered individuals, among other things, pro-
Clinton messages to post on social media and reminded them of state voting deadlines.42 None 
of these conversational chatbots are particularly threatening to political discourse—many of 
them are even designed to improve participation in the political process. The problem is that the 
technology used to create these chatbots has the potential to prey on weaknesses in the 
communication architecture and obstruct fair political processes. Fortunately, technology also 




40 Nancy Scola, “How Chatbots are Colonizing Politics,” Politico, October 11, 2016, accessed December 8, 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/chatbots-are-invading-politics-229598. 
41 Nancy Scola, “How Chatbots are Colonizing Politics,” Politico, October 11, 2016, accessed December 8, 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/chatbots-are-invading-politics-229598. 





Section Three: Detection  
 Although chatbots have the potential to disrupt political communication, it is often easy 
to know if a user on social media, particularly Twitter, is a chatbot. Some harmless chatbots are 
not concerned about trying to appear human, but others, like those intended to make a person 
look more popular than they are, or who amplify messages by liking and retweeting content, 
would like Twitter users to believe they are humans who support a person or position. Chatbots, 
however, tend to lack certain human characteristics that can help distinguish them from human 
users, and artificial intelligence itself, which enables chatbots, may be used to separate chatbots 
from humans online. 
 Chatbot profiles often lack basic Twitter profile information, like profile pictures and 
screen names: the lack of a profile picture is such a well-known characteristic that these types of 
accounts have gained the nickname “Twitter eggs,” because Twitter’s default profile picture is an 
egg.43 Additionally, when Lawrence Alexander analyzed the chatbots involved in the Boris 
Nemtsov example he found that out of the 2,900 users he analyzed, 87% of the profiles did not 
have time zone information, and 92% did not have any Twitter favorites, which was very 
different compared to a random sample of Twitter users: only 51% did not have time zone 
information, and only 15% did not have any Twitter favorites.44 This provides four 
characteristics to help discern if a Twitter user is a chatbot: screen names, profile pictures, time 
zone, and favorites. Checking to see if a profile contains this information, can help users 
determine whether a particular action comes from a human or a chatbot.  
 
43 Howard, “Algorithms, Bots, and Political Communication in the US 2016 Election: The Challenge of Automated 
Political Communication for Election Law and Administration, 83.  
44Lawrence, “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign.” 
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 Not all chatbot efforts at influencing political discourse on Twitter can be revealed by one 
person looking at one profile at a time. For instance, when chatbots like and retweet content to 
land a topic on Twitter’s list of trending topics individuals looking at the list of trending topics 
cannot tell if they are there because of the work of chatbots or not. In situations like this, 
machine learning, a subset of artificial intelligence, can be helpful. Machine learning has helped 
stop spam email for decades by “analyzing messages’ text and determining how likely it is that a 
particular message is a real communication from an actual person—or a mass-distributed 
solicitation for pharmaceuticals or claims of a long-lost fortune.”45 Social media platforms, 
governments, and other organizations could use this same technology to analyze the content of 
account profiles to determine if they are chatbots and flag or remove them. They could also 
analyze the accounts tweeting about topics and provide information about the likely percentage 
of chatbots involved in the conversation. 
 Chatbots that are designed to engage in a conversation with human users are often easy to 
detect in an extended conversation because they struggle to respond to human questions and 
comments in a similarly human way, meaning humans realize they are not talking to a real 
person. The Loebner prize is awarded every year to the creator of the most human-like chatbot, 
and the judging is done via a Turing test where judges converse via computer with both a human 
and a chatbot about certain topics and then try to guess which is the human and which is the 
chatbot.46 The 2017 competition provides insight into the problems chatbots still face in 
responding to questions and comments in a way that convinces the other participant that the bot 
 
45 “How Artificial Intelligence Can Detect—and Create—Fake News,” The Conversation, May 3, 2018, accessed 
December 8, 2018, http://theconversation.com/how-artificial-intelligence-can-detect-and-create-fake-news-95404.  
46 Charlie Moloney, “How to Win A Turing Test (The Loebner Prize),” Chatbots Magazine, September 24, 2017, 




is a human.47 All of the chatbots, even the one that ultimately won the prize, made mistakes, like 
providing dictionary definitions to questions or providing odd answers when asked to describe 
YouTube, that would have alerted a regular user that the other participant was a chatbot.48  
 Although chatbots have these weaknesses, as technology continues to progress, machine 
learning and natural language processing may resolve these weaknesses and make it more 
difficult to determine when chatbots are at work. 
  
 
47 Charlie Moloney, “How to Win A Turing Test (The Loebner Prize),” Chatbots Magazine, September 24, 2017, 
accessed December 8, 2018, https://chatbotsmagazine.com/how-to-win-a-turing-test-the-loebner-prize-
3ac2752250f1. 
48 Moloney, “How to Win A Turing Test (The Loebner Prize).”  
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Section Four: The Future of Bots 
 Machine learning and natural language processing are two technologies that have the 
potential to significantly increase chatbots’ uses. going from simply retweeting and liking 
content and engaging in simple conversations using canned responses, to creating content and 
having conversations that are convincingly human-like. Machine learning is a subset of artificial 
intelligence, and “[m]achine [l]earning at its most basic is the practice of using algorithms to 
parse data, learn from it, and then make a determination or prediction about something in the 
world.”49 A chatbot that uses machine learning can take information it gets about the popularity 
of its (or others’) posts, tweets, retweets, etc., and other responses to its activities, and use that 
information to continually update its actions to ensure its content has as much impact as possible. 
 Natural language processing is when a computer “organiz[es] and understand[s] 
language in a human way,”50 it allows computers to both understand information and 
communicate using language humans understand. A chatbot with extensive natural language 
processing skills will be able to understand conversations and content and respond to them using 
language a human user would use. Combined, these machine learning and natural language 
processing capabilities can create chatbots that can masquerade as humans and engage in 
political conversations, while using their computing power to learn how best to spread their 
message based on responses to other messages they or other actors deliver. 
 Although chatbots like these are still in the future, the technology is developing that will 
make them a reality. Once that is the case, those who are interested in affecting political 
discourse can create chatbots to function on Twitter, Facebook, or other areas online and use the 
 
49 Michael Copeland, “What’s the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep 
Learning?” Nvidia, July 29, 2016, accessed December 8, 2018, https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2016/07/29/whats-
difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-deep-learning-ai. 
50William D. Eggers, David Schatsky, and Peter Viechnicki, “AI Augmented Government: Using Cognitive 
Technologies to Redesign Public Sector Work,” Deloitte Insights, 6, April 26, 2017, accessed December 8, 2018, 
17 
 
chatbots to target people and conversations to influence their opinions and actions: “they might 
seek out susceptible users and approach them over private chat channels. They’ll eloquently 
navigate conversations and analyze a user’s data to deliver customized propaganda.”51 Humans 
will not recognize they are conversing with a chatbot that is trying to manipulate them but will 
believe they are engaged in legitimate conversations with another person. The solution to the 
problems chatbots pose will require technical, institutional, and cultural efforts.52 
  
 
51 Future Elections May be Swayed by Intelligent Weaponized Chatbots. 
52 Benkler, et., al., “Understanding Media and Information Quality in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, 




Section Five: Polarization, Chatbots, and Choice  
 During the 2016 elections misinformation and fake news were serious problems as false 
stories, particularly about Hillary Clinton, gained significant popularity.53  A study by Harvard’s 
Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society “mapped out media source networks in open web 
media (online news, blogs, etc.) and on Twitter to learn how media sources clustered together 
based on similar cross-media linking and sharing patterns”54 and found a serious rift between the 
right and the rest of the political media spectrum. They found that media like the Wall Street 
Journal, which leans center right, all the way to far left media sources, like Mother Jones, 
“comprise[d] a single interconnected media ecosystem.”55 But there was a significant gap 
between these media sources and those on the right, meaning there is little crossover between the 
news media those on the right consume and the news media those in the center and to the left 
consume.56  
 
53 See, e.g., Craig Timberg, “Russian Propaganda Effort Helped Spread ‘Fake News’ During Election, Experts Say,” 
The Washington Post, November 24, 2016, accessed December 8, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-effort-helped-spread-fake-news-during-
election-experts-say/2016/11/24/793903b6-8a40-4ca9-b712-716af66098fe_story.html?utm_term=.ddddd7132353. 
54 Benkler, et., al., “Understanding Media and Information Quality in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, 
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Network map based on Twitter media sharing from January 22, 2017, to January 21, 2018. Nodes are 
sized by number of Twitter shares.57 
Illustration 1: Network Map Showing Media Interconnectedness 
Fake news and polarization are two areas where chatbots have an important impact. 
People interested in influencing political discourse can use chatbots to amplify fake news across 
social media by sharing, liking, and retweeting. This contributes to polarization by spreading 
fake news stories within groups that do not generally interact with other media news sources that 
could disprove the false stories.  
 
57 Benkler, et., al., “Understanding Media and Information Quality in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, 
Algorithms, and Machine Learning.”  
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 Despite the expansive use of chatbots, the burgeoning interest in their ability to affect 
communication, and their increasing technological ability, chatbots are not currently in a position 
to seriously impact political discourse: the study by the Berkman Klein Center determined that 
chatbots were background noise in the 2016 elections, rather than a method of strategic 
interference.58 The researchers wrote that after conducting their analyses about communication 
during the election period, they removed accounts they identified as bots and reran their 
analyses, but found the “communication architecture…remain[ed] unchanged.”59 Instead of 
chatbots, it is the “interaction of technology, institutions, and culture” that are behind the erosion 
of political communication.60 As technology advances chatbots are likely to become a more 
strategic asset for politically motivated actors, and are therefore a cause for concern, but an 
adequate response to chatbots requires taking into consideration the many reasons behind 
chatbots’ ability to influence political discourse. Real solutions will require cultural, institutional, 
and technological efforts to protect political discourse in the future, and NATO, the EU, the 
federal government, state governments, the private sector, media, and civil society must all be 
involved.61 
NATO AND THE EU 
 Because of the international nature of Russia’s efforts to interfere in political discourse 
and weaken democracies, international institutions should become involved in preventing further 
activities. One way to do this is to create a Joint NATO-EU Task Force on Countering 
 
58Benkler, et., al., “Understanding Media and Information Quality in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, 
Algorithms, and Machine Learning.”  
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Asymmetric Threats,62 to enhance cooperation between the two on “hybrid and cyber
threats.”63  Currently, both organizations monitor Russian efforts, but they are neither
coordinated nor well-funded.64 The Joint Task Force could jointly analyze threats and ensure
that both organizations share threat information and technical expertise, and monitor 
disinformation campaigns and coordinate responses.65 NATO and the EU should also provide
more funding to NGOs who “monitor and expose disinformation campaigns,”66 thereby
providing another line of defense against foreign interference. 
U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
There are many ways the U.S. Federal Government can and should help prevent further 
chatbot and other types of cyber interference in domestic political discourse. It is critical that the 
government present a “united front” and “transcend the politicization of civic discourse” to 
declare to U.S. citizens and the world that it recognizes the threat these activities pose to 
democracy, and it is determined to punish these activities.67 To punish these activities, the 
federal government should strike at one of Russia’s weakest spots: the ruling regime’s desperate 
need to survive.68 This survival depends on “corrupt financial links that tie together the political 
leadership, security services, and business,” and the U.S. can exploit this weakness by  “using 
62 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 29. 
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sanctions, asset forfeiture, and anti-money laundering tools” to hurt the financial base of the 
Kremlin.69
The President should also consider establishing a Hybrid Threat Center at the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which, among other things, could monitor social 
media to track and analyze disinformation campaigns as well as technological trends and 
changes to prepare to respond to improvements in methods for spreading disinformation, like 
chatbots.70 It would also be wise for Congress to pass legislation that requires bots to be 
identified and labelled, so consumers know who and what they are interacting with.71
The government should also help build societal awareness of and resistance to foreign 
interference in political discourse through means like chatbots.72 This could include endorsing 
“groups that promote civics education and media literacy programs,” and working with state 
governments to establish “statewide civics and media literacy programs.”73 Hopefully, this will 
help minimize the societal divisions Russia has recently targeted to try to weaken U.S. 
democracy and impede Russia’s efforts to further exacerbate these rifts, while teaching 
Americans to be more aware of their consumption of online information and the ways their 
interactions might be manipulated.74 In conjunction with this work, the Department of Homeland 
Security or the White House, could launch a Public Service Announcement campaign to teach 
69 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 18. 
70 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
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71 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 27. 
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“smart cyber behavior” and increase awareness about foreign interference and its effects on 
“U.S. citizens, businesses, and institutions.”75  
During the summer of 2018, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings 
on foreign influence on social media where they heard from a variety of experts on the events 
that took place leading up to the 2016 elections, and they took social media platforms to task for 
not doing more to stop the spread of disinformation.76 This type of review is important, as is the 
pressure on social media companies: the government should investigate the extent and influence 
of chatbots and encourage companies to guard more carefully against chatbots. Leaning on social 
media platforms should not be the only response from the government: there is much to be 
gained from working with universities and organizations in the response to chatbots. In 
particular, the government can use the traditional method for encouraging research: grants to 
universities to encourage computer scientists to research chatbot detection and to encourage legal 
and policy experts to research chatbot effects and possible institutional and cultural solutions 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Changes in technology make chatbots possible, and they can, at the same time, protect 
against nefarious chatbot activity. Companies or concerned individuals could create programs to 
monitor Twitter or Facebook accounts, checking for characteristics that suggest the accounts are 
chatbots: time zone information, lack of favorites or profile pictures, etc. These accounts could 
then be removed, or placed on a watch list, depending on the abilities and desires of the program 
creator. The same principle could be applied to trending Twitter topics or other viral online 
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content: individuals or companies could create programs to evaluate the users that are posting to 
the topic or sharing other content to determine what percentage of the conversation is driven by 
chatbots. This technology, however, requires institutions and individuals to care enough to 
develop and apply it. Given the concern about chatbots improperly influencing politics, it would 
be valuable for researchers to also examine how to spot chatbots even as they become more 
sophisticated. 
Until recently, Facebook and Twitter, social media platforms where chatbots are 
particularly common, have been reluctant to implement measures to control and reduce chatbots. 
Recent events, and the public outcry they provoked, however, have led both platforms to take 
actions that may curb the influence of chatbots. Twitter has historically been resistant to 
censoring speech on its platform, but with the rise of ISIS and the global outcry its violence has 
provoked, Twitter began removing accounts that belonged to ISIS or ISIS operatives, which may 
have included ISIS chatbots.77  After the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and fears about chatbot 
influence, Twitter also announced changes that would limit “services that allow links and content 
to be shared across multiple accounts,” in other words, the software that enables chat bots.78 
Facebook also took steps after the 2016 elections that will likely reduce chatbot influence: after 
news broke that Russians spread fake news on Facebook in an effort to sway the elections 
results, Facebook announced that it would be conducting more rigorous fact checking and hiring 
more security personnel.79 Although these steps were specifically designed to combat fake news, 
they may also impact the number of chatbots, since chatbots were a means for spreading fake 
 
77See Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), and 
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news. Twitter and Facebook’s response to ISIS and fake news demonstrates there may be a 
certain level of public outcry necessary before the companies respond, and the outcry over ISIS 
and the 2016 elections reached the requisite level.  Relatedly, it appears there was a financial 
incentive for the companies to respond, as the stock value of both companies declined in 2018, a 
decline that is linked to election blowback.80 Now that chatbots are in the public eye, hopefully 
social media platforms will continue their efforts to curb the influence of malevolent political 
chatbots.  
There are several steps social media platforms should take in the future to curb the 
influence of chatbots. They should create clear rules for verifying users and content, and for 
when to remove content and accounts that violate the platforms Terms of Service.81 Platforms 
should continue to work on AI tools that can identify chatbots that are manipulating social 
media,82 which, combined with greater efforts to remove accounts that violate the platform’s 
Terms of Service, will help stem the growth of malicious chatbot activity. Beyond what each 
company does individually to combat manipulative chatbots, social media and news platforms 
should create means to collaborate on the effort to stop chatbots from spreading disinformation 
and manipulating public opinion.83 This is particularly important because disinformation 
80 Elizabeth Dwoskin and Craig Timberg, “’Too Easy to Manipulate: Russian Disinformation Finally Costs 
Facebook and Twitter,” The Washington Post, July 31, 2018, accessed December 8, 2018, 
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Democracies,” 32. 
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campaigns are not usually limited to one platform, but work across multiple platforms to 
exacerbate societal divisions.84 
The new interest in the effects of chatbots on political discourse may also spur more 
research on technological methods to detect chatbots. Universities and think tanks should devote 
resources to studying how to identify and respond to chatbots, especially as technology makes it 
increasingly difficult to separate chatbots from humans. For example, some universities, 
including the University of Texas at Austin are starting cross-disciplinary programs to train 
individuals on the legal, technical, and policy issues involved in cyber security, including issues 
like chatbots. This type of education is important because it makes it easier to come up with 
solutions that take into consideration the difficulties chatbots present in technical, legal, and 
social areas. Private companies also have an important role to play in these programs as they can 
provide an important source of funding; for example, in 2014 the Hewlett Foundation provided 
$45 million to three universities to fund new cybersecurity policy initiatives.85 Philanthropies, 
and companies with philanthropy branches should continue to support organizations that are 
working to identify manipulative chatbots and stop the spread of disinformation.86  
MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS 
 Media organizations also have a role to play in chatbots influence on political discourse. 
Chatbots can spread disinformation across social media platforms and create artificial news 
trends. This information and these trends may eventually be used by or reported on by traditional 
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news sources, giving further authority to false or manipulative narratives.87 To help prevent this, 
news organizations can implement “guidelines for using social media accounts as sources in 
stories.”88 These guidelines should include verifying social media accounts before publishing 
information from them by ensuring the account is verified by the social media platform, and by 
contacting the user on the phone.89 News media should also be more responsible in citing social 
media posts by quoting, rather than embedding them.90 This removes information about “replies, 
retweets, and favorites, which might provide an “inaccurate snapshot of an account’s popularity 
or legitimization of the information due to the account’s alleged popularity,”91 popularity that 
can be faked using chatbots. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUALS 
Civil society and individuals also have a duty to help prevent chatbots and disinformation 
from manipulating political discourse Individuals need to change how they consume and respond 
to news. A chatbot cannot force a person to do or think something, no matter how sophisticated, 
instead, chatbots exploit division within society and between people.92 
 
 
87 See, Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference 
in Democracies,” 34. 
88 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 34. 
89Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 34. 
90 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 34. 
91 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, “Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies,” 34. 
92“Exhibit,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accessed December 8, 2018, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/exhibits-080118.pdf. 
28 
Illustration 2: Popular Memes Distributed by the Russian Government93 
As technology advances and allows chatbots to become more dangerous, it can also help 
identify and stop nefarious chatbots, but it cannot be the only line of defense. Individuals need to 
take ownership of their experience and interactions online. This should include working to 
prevent polarization and filter bubbles by proactively reading from different news sources on 
both the right and left, rather than reading the individualized articles social media platforms offer 
users.  It would be useful for individuals that are on social media to have a basic knowledge of 
common characteristics of chatbots and fake news: with the rise of online classes and education, 
it would be easy to complete a class on social media and news integrity. It should also mean 
simply being aware of the possibility of chatbots’ effort to impact political discourse, and not 
being swept along by a trend or story without personally investigating either. Chatbots have the 
potential to change political discourse, whether that change is good or bad depends not only on 
technology, but how individual members of society respond to the events and discourse around 
them. 
93 “Exhibit,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accessed December 8, 2018, 
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These two pictures were 
created by the Russian 
government and distributed 
over Facebook. The picture 
of the veteran had 723, 750 
engagements on Facebook, 
and the Yosemite Sam 
picture was the most shared 
post on Facebook, with 
986, 203 engagements. 
Both are an example of 
some of the information 
chatbots might spread, and 
both exploit pre- existing 
rifts within U.S. society. 
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 Individuals should also “pressure elected officials to take this threat seriously and address 
it immediately.”94 Individual citizens should also come together to create advocacy groups that 
raise awareness about the issues of chatbots and disinformation and put pressure on officials.95 
 Chatbots are a world-wide phenomenon, and political actors have used them for a variety 
of purposes. Fortunately, chatbots cannot yet masquerade well as humans in extended 
conversations, but as technology advances it will provide chatbots with more abilities and 
increase their potential to interfere with political discourse. It is tempting to lay the blame for 
chatbots’ interference purely at the feet of technology, but chatbots exploit previously existing 
divisions and weaknesses in society, which means the problem, and the solution, are not simply 
technical. The solution to the problem of nefarious chatbots lies at the intersection of culture, 
technology, and institutions,96 and it is key for actors in each of these areas to find ways to help 
stem the advance of bad-intentioned chatbots—if they do, chatbots may be a help to society, 
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